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ABSTRACT 
Why are some countries more technologically innovative than others? The dominant explanation 
amongst political-economists is that domestic institutions determine national innovation rates. 
However, after decades of research, there is still no agreement on precisely how this happens, 
exactly which institutions matter, and little aggregate evidence has been produced to support any 
particular hypothesis. This paper will review the equivocating evidence for domestic institutions 
explanations of national innovation rates. Its survey will show that, although a specific domestic 
institution or policy might appear to explain a particular instance of innovation, they generally 
fail to explain national innovation rates across time and space. Instead, the empirical evidence 
suggests that certain kinds of international relationships (e.g. capital goods imports, foreign 
direct investment, educational exchanges) affect national innovation rates in the aggregate, and 
that these relationships are not themselves determined by domestic institutions. In other words, 
explaining national innovation rates may not be so much a domestic institutions story as it is an 
international story. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Why are some countries more technologically innovative than others? Amongst political 
economists, the answer seems clear and universal: domestic institutions determine national innovation 
rates. One encounters this assertion throughout the literature. It is therefore awkward to discover that 
there exists little consensus on exactly which institutions determine innovation rates or precisely how they 
do so. Nor is there much empirical support for domestic institutions causing innovation in the aggregate, 
regardless of the type of institution tested or the measure of innovation used. To be more precise: 
although institution or policy “X” might appear to explain a certain country’s innovation rate at a specific 
point in time, it does not do so over time nor in other countries. Yet, despite these problems, a core belief 
in a causal relationship between domestic institutions and national innovation rates remains widely held 
and little challenged. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First it will attempt to confront head-on this contradiction 
between theory, evidence, and the popularity of the institutions-innovation hypothesis. Put simply, for a 
hypothesis to be so widely accepted, but so loosely supported, is a situation that demands greater scrutiny. 
To that end, I will survey the major domestic institutions theories of innovation and the evidence for (or 
against) their generalizeability. We will find that, despite decades of research, scholars have yet to specify 
any institution or policy, or set of institutions (or policies), that consistently explain innovation rates 
across time and space. Indeed, both qualitative case studies and statistical analysis find nations with all 
varieties of domestic institutions innovating at all different levels. Let me be clear: I am not arguing here 
that domestic institutions have no causal effect on innovation rates; rather I contend that existing 
institutional theories of innovation have been over-stated, over-simplified, and need to be re-examined. 
Second, this paper will then suggest that international relationships, not domestic institutions, 
may be the missing piece to the national innovation rate puzzle. Anecdotal observations within the 
evidence provided by domestic institutionalists suggest that certain kinds of international relationships 
(e.g. capital goods imports, foreign direct investment, educational exchanges) might have a significant 
role in determining national innovation rates. Recent research also suggests that these international 
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relationships are not themselves determined by domestic institutions. Empirical analysis of various 
measures of innovation, domestic institutions, and international relationships confirms these suspicions. 
The data suggest that certain kinds of international relationships with the lead innovator (the United 
States) strongly affect countries’ innovation rates, even when controlling for the most prominent domestic 
institutions.  
This research surveyed here is new in several respects. First, it challenges the prevailing 
sentiment regarding domestic institutions and innovation which, despite its contradictions, remains little 
critiqued. Second, it does so by examining the roles of several independent variables which have either 
not previously been considered or not simultaneously controlled for in single tests. Third, the research 
surveyed below is more generalizeable than much prior research; its supporting evidence consists of data 
on cross-national quantitative datasets covering several decades, rather than relying single case studies as 
has been the practice in most previous empirical work.  
Finally, in order to facilitate discussion, this paper will present elementary analysis; relegating to 
the footnotes discussions of more complicated statistical approaches and methodological issues. I do this 
for three reasons. Most importantly, the simple empirical evidence for my argument is clear and 
compelling. We do not need to control for a dozen conditional variables in a complex statistical estimator 
in order to see it plainly. Rather, simple scatterplots and time-series will do. I am not attempting to avoid 
more sophisticated analysis. Certainly, I can and do include controls for numerous economic, political, 
and demographic factors. I also triangulate measures for each of the major study variables (institutions 
and innovation) using multiple, distinct, and independent datasets. But the results remain robust and 
unaffected. Hence a second reason is brevity. The statistically curious researcher can refer to the 
footnoted papers for thorough technical discussions of competing estimators, measures, and model 
specifications; discussions which would otherwise bog down the very basic argument I am trying to make 
here. Lastly, in taking this approach, I acknowledge that many of those involved in the innovation debate 
specialize in qualitative research (including highly respected scholars on this conference panel and 
reading its papers). To them, regressions are either opaque or artifice or both. Though I am a practitioner 
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of quantitative methods, I cannot help but sympathize somewhat with this critique. There is simply much 
quantitative research which takes low quality data and puts it through a “taffy-machine” of statistical 
analysis. Often only specialists can judge the end product, if at all, while the rest of the scientific 
community are left out of the debate, skeptical and unconvinced. Therefore in an attempt at greater public 
scrutiny, this paper will attempt to offer clear points, backed by transparent data and methods. I do this 
with confidence because I have found that applying the statistical “taffy-machine” only strengthens the 
findings below. I use only publicly accessible datasets, hence the sophisticated statistical reader is 
encouraged to confirm this for herself. 
 
II. Why Domestic Institutions? 
Various explanations for national differences in innovation rates have been proposed over the 
years. Often generated by individual case studies from across the social sciences, these hypotheses have 
covered a wide range of independent variables including: the importance of military spending and 
weapons systems development,1 factor scarcity,2 first-mover advantages,3 population or economic size, 
late-industrialization,4 culture,5 and historical contingencies.6 However, explanations based on domestic 
institutions have come to dominate the innovation debate. 7 This is not due to some clearly identifiable 
superiority of domestic institutions theories over other schools of thought. So we should start our 
discussion by asking: why domestic institutions? 
Institutions dominate the innovation debate in part because they are the proximate tools which 
governments use to promote innovation. Also, institutions differ across the industrialized democracies as 
do innovation rates. Therefore a causal linkage between domestic institutions and technological change 
                                                 
1 Smith 1985.  
2 Hicks; 1932; Habakkuk 1962; Leontief 1954. 
3 Porter 1990. 
4 Gerschenkron 1962. 
5 Dore 1987. 
6 Burke 1978.  
7 In this paper, I limit my treatment to those theories which adhere closest to Douglass North’s description of institutions as “the 
rules of the game in a society”, sets of established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations between individuals, groups, 
and organizations. North (1990), pp. 3-10. Also, I use the terms “institutions” and “policies” in this paper more or less 
interchangeably. I consider them to be different degrees of the same concept (or at least as overlapping concepts) with the former 
being greater in scope, depth, longevity, and/or inertia than the latter. More specifically, my intention is explicitly not to play a 
game of semantics in which I criticize “institutions” explanations, but am silent on or allow exception for “policy” explanations. 
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makes good sense, at least prima facie. But then, so do many of the alternatives listed above. They too 
vary across countries and offer rewards and incentives for or against innovation, albeit less proximately or 
consciously than institutions. 
Rather, the debate’s fixation on domestic institutions seems not to result from a series of well-
tested hypotheses, but from advances in economic theory, specifically in the economics of science and in 
formal economic growth theory. In these subfields, economists have come to believe that certain domestic 
institutions are necessary to address the obstacles which prevent or slow innovation. For example, some 
innovation scholars highlight the non-rival and non-excludable aspects of inventive activity, thus casting 
innovation as a public goods problem.8 Other scholars emphasize the high levels of uncertainty, risk, high 
transactions costs, and incomplete information associated with innovation.9 Still other researchers call 
attention to the distributive aspects of technological change, and the ability of interest groups hurt by it to 
influence government policy and obstruct innovation.10  
Theoretically, domestic institutions help solve each of these problems. Institutions solve the free-
rider problem by providing selective incentives. Institutions also lower information and transaction costs; 
they lower and spread risk and uncertainty. Hence as social scientists, when we see the problems 
associated with the production of scientific public goods, we are naturally drawn to institutional 
explanations. Finally, properly designed domestic institutions can also prevent the Stiglerian capture of 
government policy by status-quo interest groups whom might oppose technological change. Thus 
domestic institutions have come to play a determining causal role in theories of national innovation rates.  
But exactly which institutions matter? This is where the theoretical trail breaks down. Domestic 
institutions theories of innovation take myriad forms and employ different levels of analysis. Elements of 
a state-level domestic institutions theory of technological change can be recognized as early as the 1791 
Report on Manufactures by Alexander Hamilton and Tench Coxe, and certainly in the writings of German 
                                                 
8 Arrow 1962; Romer 1990; Hall & Jones 1999; Aghion & Howitt 1998 
9  Nelson 1959; North 1990 
10 Mokyr 1990; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson 2005 
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political-economist Friedrich List.11 But many early theorists who focused on the institutions-innovation 
relationship failed to specify their independent variable. Indeed, even prominent economists who have 
attempted to deal systematically with technological change (including Smith, Marx,12 Solow, and even 
Schumpeter) have generally regarded science and technology as “black boxes” proceeding according to 
their own internal processes largely independent of political or economic forces; they therefore tended to 
omit its causality from their analysis.  
This changed with the Cold War, when the economics of science and modern economic growth 
theory were born. As discussed above, theorists in these subfields began to endogenize technological 
change, and attempted to identify specific institutions which should affect it. Unfortunately, much of the 
empirical evidence they used to substantiate, or generate, these hypotheses was either equivocal, based on 
anecdotal evidence, or on non-generalizeable case studies. Finally, in the late-1980s, a new research 
program was created to address these problems. It employed a comprehensive cross-national empirical 
approach designed to identify the specific domestic institutions responsible for differences in national 
innovation rates. This effort was termed the “National Innovation Systems” (NIS) research program and,  
though it changed the practice of innovation research, the next section will show that it has not produced 
any general hypotheses. 
 
II. National Innovation Systems: Empirically Rich, Theory Poor 
NIS research was originally designed to be the empirical solution to a theory-laden debate over 
innovation rates. Ironically, NIS has created the opposite situation: a library full of excellent empirical 
case-studies of domestic institutions and policies, but no general theory of national innovation rates. 
NIS was perhaps the first systematic cross-national approach to studying innovation rates.13 It 
arose in response to empirical puzzles posed by radical and unexpected changes in national innovation 
                                                 
11 Granted, these men did not seek to explain technological innovation per se. Instead they argued for the creation of what today 
might be called “industrial policy”: a combination of trade, finance, budgetary, procurement, and regulatory policies (and the 
formal government institutions necessary to support them) which would foster growth and improvement in their nations’ 
domestic industrial base. Throughout the following two centuries, these ideas were taken up with great enthusiasm by 
policymakers in developing Germany, Japan, and other states in Europe, Asia, and even Latin America. Hamilton 1791; List 
1841. 
12 For an alternative view of Marx, see Bimber 1994. 
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rates during the 1970s and 1980s. These unexpected changes included the 1) apparent decline of 
established technological leaders such as the US and Great Britain, 2) the rapid rise to technological 
power of Japan, and 3) the sudden appearance of Taiwan, South Korea and other newly industrialized 
countries at or near the technological frontier. None of these phenomena were easily explained by existing 
theories of innovation in politics or economics. Moreover, the flurry of anecdote-driven research which 
attempted to explain these anomalies created instead a confusing array of conflicting theories and policy 
prescriptions. In response, political economists in the United States and Europe initiated NIS, which took 
a more holistic and empirical approach to studying the effects of domestic institutions on innovation rates. 
And since its inception, NIS has become one of the dominant paradigms within the subfield of innovation 
research.  
The NIS approach to explaining national innovation rates starts with the recognition that 
innovation, be it performed by firms or individuals, occurs within the context of broader political and 
economic institutions and policies. NIS further posits that these institutions and policies together form a 
“system” which determines a country’s rate and direction of technological “innovation”. And since these 
institutions and policies differ from nation to nation, and in fact define nations to some extent, they 
therefore constitute “national innovation systems”. Of course, NIS scholars recognized that this view of 
technological change was not entirely new, but was reminiscent of Hamilton and List.14
 What was new in the NIS research program was the empirical depth and thoroughness with which 
its proponents approached the subject. Generally using a case study approach, NIS scholars focused their 
research on identifying and probing the roles of dozens of specific national institutions and policies which 
affect innovation. Pioneered by economists Christopher Freeman, Bengt-Ake Lundvall, Richard Nelson, 
and Charles Edquist,15 NIS scholars examined the interactions and effects on innovation of different 
educational institutions, science policies, trade regimes, legal frameworks, financial institutions, anti-trust 
laws, etc. They also took care to observe these domestic institutions across a wide spectrum of nations, 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Nelson 1993; Lundvall 1992; Edquist 1997. 
14 Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995. 
   6
many of which had been little studied in previous research on innovation. For instance, in Nelson’s 
seminal publication, NIS scholars analyzed large, wealthy, frontier innovators (Japan, US, Germany), 
small wealthy but innovsative states (Denmark, Canada, Sweden), and lesser developed countries both 
innovative (Israel, Taiwan) and not (Argentina, Brazil). Since then, other researchers have gone on to 
apply the NIS methodology to a variety of disparate states from Finland to China, Slovakia to Algeria, 
Hungary to Argentina.16
But while the NIS research program has made major empirical contributions to the debate, a 
problem with generalizability soon emerged. Taken as a whole, the separate NIS case studies suggest 
some 20-30 major independent variables (policies and institutions), each of which may play a role in 
technological innovation depending on its configuration vis-à-vis the other variables. Thus NIS has 
brought to light the complexity of the innovation process and the diversity of factors involved in it; but 
has failed to produce any general theory. 
For example, in the case of the U.S., NIS scholars contend that the key drivers of technological 
progress since World War II include military procurement, timely and strong anti-trust actions, small 
firms, and universities.17 Yet none of these variables figure significantly in Japan’s national innovation 
system. Rather, Japan’s innovative strength during the post-war period emanates from tight government 
control over trade and investment, cooperative industry-labor relations, and specific corporate 
management techniques, each of which are missing from the U.S. case.18 Studies of the UK, Germany, 
France, Korea, and Taiwan similarly expand the list of variables.19 Furthermore, since the successful 
operation of each NIS variable often depends upon its context, we find ourselves with a rapid 
proliferation of viable national innovation systems. So while the relatively strong American anti-trust 
regime helps innovation, it does so in the context of free trade and capital mobility; conversely, Japan’s 
relatively weak anti-trust enforcement seems to aid innovation when configured with its system of 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Nelson 1993; Lundvall; 1992; Edquist 1997. 
16 Oinas 2005; Sun 2002; Balaz 2005; Saad & Zawdie 2005; De Tournemine & Muller 1996; Correa 1998.  
17 Mowrey & Rosenberg 1993. 
18 Odagiri & Goto 1993. 
19 Nelson 1993; see also Kim & Nelson 2000. 
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industrial policy and captive finance. Hence, in addition to a large number of variables, the NIS approach 
produces an exponentially greater number of possible combinations of these variables, each of which may 
promote or hinder innovation. This lack of parsimony poses a problem for both theorizing and testing, 
especially in cases where the same independent variable is attributed with different effects on innovation 
rates in different countries.20
Thus, after twenty years of research NIS scholars have yet to produce any general hypotheses to 
explain differences in national innovation rates. That is, while they have achieved their empirical goal of 
increasing the set of datapoints and potential relationships between them, NIS scholars have yet to fit a 
theory to them. I am perhaps overly emphatic on this point because a common occurrence in innovation 
debates is for audience members, article reviewers, or casual observers to bring up policy or institution 
“X” as the solution to the institutions-innovation puzzle. Often these claimants are experts in a particular 
region, country, industry, or time-period; and institution “X” may full well seem to explain innovation 
rates in their particular area of study. But often these claimants are unaware of the NIS literature, which 
has usually studied their particular “X” in multiple industries, countries, and time-periods, and failed to 
find consistent outcomes.  
Certainly, additional research may yet identify a particular institution, policy, or combination 
thereof that does provide a generalizeable explanation of innovation rates. But to date, NIS research has 
been of such high quality and thoroughness that I and others feel that new approaches should be taken, 
and new variables considered. Amongst those who agree with this pessimism are Varieties of Capitalism 
researchers who have generated an exciting new line of research, which is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
20 While I critique NIS here for its lack of strong theoretical foundations, it is important to note that its atheoretical approach was 
a strategic choice by some of its founders, not a product of bad research design. For example, the 1993 case studies coordinated 
by NIS pioneer Richard Nelson were written in direct response to the inability of innovation theory to predict empirical reality. 
While endogenous growth theorists had made enormous contributions to economists’ understanding of innovation, Nelson 
critiqued them for neglecting or mis-specifying many important independent variables and causal relationships. He recommended 
that empirical research, in the form of in-depth qualitative case studies, was necessary to capture the causal factors missed by 
grand theory (Nelson 1997). However, much of the existing empirical research of the sort suggested by Nelson was based on just 
a single country (often Japan). Hence, the idea behind the NIS movement was to increase “the number of ‘points’ that a causal 
theory had to ‘fit’”(Nelson 1993).   
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III. Varieties of Capitalism: Theoretically Rich, But Selects on the Dependent Variable 
Recently, there have since been several attempts to explain why NIS institutions and policies are 
unable to explain innovation rates in the aggregate. Most of these arguments imply that NIS explanations 
do not generalize well because the mid-level institutions and policies they focus on are endogenous: their 
technological goals, and their efficiency in achieving these goals, are determined by yet broader political 
and economic institutions.  
One prominent school of thought along these lines is “Varieties of Capitalism” (VOC) theory. 
VOC scholars, in part, seek to fill the gap between endogenous growth theory and the NIS research 
program. They agree with both schools of thought that domestic institutions best explain national 
innovation rates. However, they critique the NIS approach for its lack of theory and parsimony. They also 
fault endogenous growth theory for its failure to adequately consider non-market relationships between 
economic actors. VOC theory is an attempt to address both sets of weaknesses. 
As put forward by Peter Hall & David Soskice (2001), VOC theory argues that the behavior of a 
country’s NIS institutions and its innovators are both endogenous to markets.21 That is, the more a nation 
allows markets to structure its domestic economic relationships, the more innovative its economic actors 
will be. Conversely, the more a nation chooses to coordinate economic relationships via non-market 
mechanisms, the more slowly and incrementally innovative its economic actors will be. This is admittedly 
a highly condensed version of a nuanced and sophisticated theory, but it is accurate for the purposes of 
our discussion. 
Overall, the VOC causal explanation is both theoretically appealing and dovetails with some 
widely held stereotypes about national differences in innovation; however, little empirical data was 
produced to support its central claim. The evidence offered by Hall & Soskice consisted of only four 
years of patent data from the European Patent Office (EPO) which shows that Germany and the US 
concentrate their patenting as predicted by VOC theory. Specifically, Hall & Soskice examined patenting 
activity by Germany (a coordinated market economy, or “CME”) and the US (a liberal market economy, 
                                                 
21 Hall and Soskice 2001. 
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or “LME”) in 30 technology classes during 1983-84 and 1993-94 (Figure 1 below). They found that 
Germany’s patent specialization was almost equal and opposite that of the US in both time periods. More 
specifically, the Germans were found to be more active innovators in industries which Hall & Soskice 
characterize as dominated by incremental innovation (such as mechanical engineering, product handling, 
transport, consumer durables, and machine tools); meanwhile, firms in the US innovated 
disproportionately in industries which the authors perceive as more radically innovative (including 
medical engineering, biotechnology, semiconductors, and telecommunications). 
Several possible problems exist with this approach, but the main concerns are with selection bias 
and measurement error.22 First, the VOC scholars compare only 4 years worth of data from only 2 
countries. Second, the country chosen to represent liberal market economies (LMEs) is the United States, 
a technological innovation outlier by almost any measure. Third, they use patent counts as their measure 
of innovation rates. But simply counting up a nation’s patents does not provide a good measure of 
innovative output since it treats trivial inventions the same as major ones (research has shown that it 
corresponds better with innovative inputs [e.g. R&D spending, sci-tech labor, etc.]).23 As a solution, 
innovation scholars weight patents by forward citations in order to control for patent quality. A more 
complete discussion of innovation measurement and the appropriate use of patent data can be found in the 
Appendix below. 
  
 
22 For example, simple patent counts do not provide a good measure of innovative output since they treat trivial inventions the 
same as major ones. As a solution, innovation scholars weight patents by forward citations in order to control for patent quality. 
They also triangulate datasets by using other innovation measures, such as science & engineering research publications, and high-
tech exports. Also, VOC’s theory assumes that some industries are inherently more innovative than others, a description not born 
out by the historical record, though probably not problematic during the time period considered by Hall & Soskice 2001. 
23 Griliches 1984, 1990. See Appendix. 
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Figure 1: Patent Specialization by Technology Class in Germany and The U.S. 
: Higher scores indicate greater specialization in innovation in that particular type of technology.  
Source: Charts reproduced here with data obtained through the cooperation of Thomas Cusack, David Soskice, and Peter Hall. See also Hall & Soskice 2001, pp 42-43. 
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Figure 2: Citations-weighted patents per million population (1975-1995) 
Source: NBER Patent Dataset, World Bank Development Indicators 
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A more thorough analysis using twenty years of citations-weighted patents for all of the LME and 
CME countries paints a distinctly different picture. Figure 2 (above) presents a simplified version of the 
main results.24 As the chart shows, VOC theory does not accurately predict innovative behavior over time 
and space: LME and CME countries innovate at about the same rates. The LME’s have greater variance, 
but their mean is more or less the same as the CME’s. If one uses individual patents as the unit of 
analysis, a similar result is produced: LME patents are no more radically innovative than CME patents, 
especially if you exclude the US data. This picture is further corroborated by data on scientific 
publications: scientists in the LME’s are no more radically innovative, do not concentrate in more cutting-
edge subfields, than those in CME’s.  
 
IV. Political Decentralization: Theoretically Over-determined, Anecdotally Rich, But Aggregately 
Insignificant 
                                                 
24 Additional data, regression analysis, and technical discussions can be found in Taylor 2004 
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Political decentralization offers another route to high innovation rates; one which might also 
explain the weak explanatory power of NIS and VOC research. Indeed, political decentralization is one of 
the most theoretically over-determined explanations for national innovation rates. Decentralized 
governments are widely seen as agile, competitive, and well structured to adapt to innovation’s gale of 
creative destruction. Meanwhile centralized organizations of all sizes, from firms to nation-states, have 
come to be viewed as rigid and thus either hostile to the risks, costs, and change associated with new 
technology, or prone to cling too long to fool-hearty or outdated technological projects. These sentiments 
are in fact so pervasive that they can be found both in the popular press25 and throughout the academic 
literature26 But like the two research programs discussed in the previous sections, while the popular 
association between political decentralization and innovation is strong, the empirical evidence consists 
mostly of anecdotal observations and stylized case studies. A more rigorous and comprehensive analysis 
tells a more equivocal story about the advantages of decentralization for innovators. 
Political decentralization proponents emphasize four primary mechanisms by which government 
structure should affect national innovation rates. First, they argue that both horizontal and vertical 
decentralization increase the number of political and economic units participating in, funding, and 
demanding innovative activities. This not only multiplies technological search and experimentation 
efforts,27 but can also increase the diversity of these research efforts and the information acquired through 
them.28  
Second, scholars assert that, by increasing the number of units, decentralization increases 
competition, thus increasing the incentives for innovation. This theme is perhaps best specified by 
federalism scholars, who point out that decentralization can result in a “Delaware effect” in which sub-
national governments compete with one another to attract business investment, and therefore constantly 
improve the legal, tax, and regulatory environments for innovators.29 This concept has evolved into 
                                                 
25 Suroweicki, 2004 
26 Rosenberg & Birdzell, 1985; Mokyr 1990, 2002; Drezner 2001, Acemoglu et. al., 2006 
27 Drezner, 2001; Mokyr 1990, 2002; Weingast, 1995; Nelson, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005 
28 Drezner, 2001; Mokyr 1990, 2002; Rosenberg & Birdzell, 1985; Suroweicki, 2004; Acemoglu et. al. 2005 
29 Cary, 1974; Oates 1972 
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Weingast’s “market-preserving federalism”, in which federalism can prevent government from acting in a 
predatory manner toward innovators, and allow credible commitments to produce pro-market policies and 
public goods.30  
Third, federalism theory holds that political decentralization leads to both better policy design and 
public goods provision at the local level. Adhering to Hayek (1945), the idea here is that local 
policymakers simply have superior information concerning local conditions than do distant national 
legislators or bureaucrats, and can therefore design better policy for the local environment. Better policy 
should in turn mean more efficient allocation of resources toward, and proper incentives for, local 
innovators. In addition, decentralized local public goods production is often better at reflecting popular 
preferences than is centralized national public goods production. As Tiebout (1956) put it, different sub-
national governments provide a menu of different policy environments, which allows different kinds of 
“consumer-voters” of public goods (here innovators consuming scientific knowledge, investors looking 
for R&D opportunities, high-tech labor seeking employment, and so forth) to choose the environment that 
is right for them. So, for example, innovators in Massachusetts can use state government funding to 
pursue stem cell research, while Kansas’ more rural and religious taxpayers can instead fund initiatives in 
agricultural sciences, and California’s public universities can focus on alternative energy. In a unitary 
state, this type of public goods preference matching would not occur as systematically. Surowecki (2004) 
describes this as a form of decentralization-driven specialization which makes innovators more productive 
and efficient. It could alternately be interpreted as precisely the kind of national environment conducive to 
producing Richard Florida’s (2002) “creative cities”. 
Fourth, several scholars argue that political decentralization aids national innovation rates by 
making the state less vulnerable to capture by status-quo interest groups.31 Put simply, more centralized 
governments are more vulnerable to interest-group capture because they have fewer decision-making 
points and veto-players to control. Therefore, ceteris paribus, more capture-able centralized governments 
                                                 
30 Weingast, 1995; Qian & Weingast, 1997 
31 Drezner, 2001; Mokyr 1990, 2002; Rosenberg & Birdzell, 1984; Weingast, 1995; Acemoglu et. al., 2005 
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are more likely to make policies which slow technological innovation. Once made, such policies will be 
imposed across the entire nation due to the centralized nature of government in these states. Conversely, 
in decentralized states, even if similar policies arise, they can be reversed or overridden by sub-national 
governments. A good example of this in the U.S. might be AIDS research during the 1980s when 
powerful interest groups exerted their influence on the federal executive branch to slow innovation in 
these areas. However, the federal legislature, as well as state and city governments, were able to override 
the objections of the executive branch and provide regulatory or budgetary support for research; while the 
courts served as an additional point of entry for supporters of technological progress.32  
This fourth aspect of government structure might also help to explain why NIS and VOC 
institutional explanations have failed to generalize across different countries and time periods. According 
to decentralization proponents, technological innovation poses not just a public goods dilemma, it also 
suffers from an interest-group capture problem. Status-quo interest groups are those whose assets (e.g. 
skills, capital, land) are hurt by technological change. In order to obstruct threatening technological 
changes, these interest groups will often seek to influence or capture precisely those institutions and 
policies which NIS scholars use to explain innovation rates. Even the presence of markets cannot prevent 
this phenomena, argue Acemoglu et. al. (2005) and Drezner (2001), since markets and property rights are 
but institutions subject to the will of captured state apparatus.33 Thus NIS and VOC explanations fail to 
generalize across time and space because the institutions & policies they prescribe are endogenous to 
government structure: their technological goals, and their efficiency in achieving these goals, are 
determined by the ability of broader state structures to resist interest-group capture.  
                                                 
32 Shilts, 1987 
33 But what if a centralized government is strongly pro-technology or captured by pro-technology interest-groups? After all, 
centralized government can better solve coordination dilemmas that inhibit technological progress, and marshal the economic 
resources necessary for massive projects such as late-industrialization, space flight, or atomic weaponry. Therefore more 
centralized government should be good for innovation when powerful interest-groups favor it. Yet Drezner (2001) points out that, 
even in these cases, decentralized states still have an advantage because the sub-national provinces can act as experimental test 
beds for different kinds of policies and innovations. Over time, the vulnerability of centralized states to interest-group capture 
will outweigh any benefits, as new innovations rapidly evolve into status-quo interests and thus a drag on further technological 
progress. 
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Ideally, in order to test the political decentralization thesis, one would want to perform a natural 
experiment, in which observed changes in government structure can be followed by observations of 
changes in innovative activity, with all other factors held constant. While no empirical situation fits this 
ideal, we do have a number of cases in which governments have decentralized over time, and where we 
can also collect some quantitative data on innovative outputs. These are presented in Figure 3 (below). 
This graph plots changes in decentralization versus changes in innovation in the twenty-nine countries 
which underwent the largest changes in government decentralization from 1975-95. In addition, I also 
plotted the results for the twenty-five countries with the largest changes in relative innovation rates.34 The 
measure of innovation used is citations-weighted patents per capita (see Appendix), but similar graphs 
can be made for science-engineering publications, or other measures of technological capability. 
Figure 3: Innovation vs. Decentralization in 45 Countries (1975-95) 
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Source: United States Patent & Trademark Office, NBER (2001) 
                                                 
34 Overlap between the two sets of countries and missing POLCON data for Hong Kong and the Bahamas brings the total number 
of countries to forty-five. 
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As my measure of overall decentralization in this graph, I employ the POLCON Index developed 
by Witold Henisz (U. Penn).35 The POLCON Index is a 0-1 measure which takes into account the number 
of independent branches of government with veto power over policy, modified by the extent of party 
alignment across branches of government and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each 
legislative branch. The inclusion of party alignment and legislative preferences means that POLCON is 
not a pure measure of structural decentralization. However, unlike measures which rely purely on formal 
institutional structure, the POLCON measure allows me to control for states which may be formally 
decentralized but which may suffer ineffective de facto checks and balances. It also provides a finer 
gauge than the traditional technique of using “dummies”. Moreover, the POLCON index has been shown 
to be statistically and positively significant in affecting both business investment decisions and 
technological diffusion in various countries, therefore it is natural to ask whether it holds similar 
significance for innovation rates.36  
If decentralization is as overwhelming an influence on innovation as is assumed in the literature, 
then those states which have decentralized the most should enjoy significant improvements in innovation 
rates. That is, we should see a clear diagonal line of points stretching upwards across the graph above. 
However, as Figure 3 reveals, only Taiwan and South Korea appear have experienced significant 
increases in both variables. Otherwise, the countries that decentralized most (Spain, Ecuador, Portugal, 
Greece, and Thailand), experienced little change in innovation rates; while the countries which had major 
shifts in innovative performance (Japan, Israel, Switzerland, US, Finland) underwent little change in 
government structure. Of course, “decentralization” in many of these countries was more horizontal and 
informal, and is perhaps better described as a move from autocracy or single-party government towards 
genuine multi-party democracy. But this is precisely the point: even using the broadest definition and 
least formal measure of decentralization, it is difficult to find a correlation with innovation. 
                                                 
35 Henisz 2000.  
36 Delios and Henisz. 2000; Henisz 2002; Henisz & Zelner. 2001.  
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Using the same measure of innovation, Figure 4 (below) selects out those countries with the 
largest increases in relative innovation rates from 1975-95. The first thing that should strike us here is 
how little change in relative innovation rates there is at all. Few of the 74 countries sampled registered 
any significant shift in their relative rankings, and those with less than a 7.5 percent change have been left 
off of the graph altogether. Secondly, even a cursory examination reveals that the decentralized states  
Figure 4: Change in Per Capita Patent Cites Received as Percent of World Ave. (1970-75 vs. 1990-
95) 
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Korea, Canada, Singapore, Finland, United States, Israel, Taiwan, Japan. 
 
appear to have had little innovative advantage over other states, regardless of size or wealth. The 
decentralized US and Canada both experienced large relative gains in forward patent cites per capita; 
meanwhile the federalist states of Germany and Switzerland suffered significant relative declines. 
Amongst the biggest gainers are countries like Japan, Taiwan, Israel, Singapore and South Korea, all 
relatively centralized states. One major new innovator, Finland, even marginally increased its 
centralization (as measured by POLCON). But before we credit centralization with this achievement, we 
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must also note that three of the most centralized European states (France, Great Britain, and Sweden) are 
amongst the largest decliners in relative innovation rates. More interesting is the nation that does not 
appear in Figure 4, Spain, which significantly decentralized by almost any measure one can calculate. 
Spain’s negative change in relative innovative performance (a mere -0.01 percent) is too small to register 
on this graph, despite the fact that its government continuously decentralized, both horizontally and 
vertically, formally and informally, throughout the entire time period sampled. Hence, even if I “cheat” 
by selecting on the dependent variable, I cannot substantiate a relationship between structure and 
innovation! 
Of course, these simple statistical tests do not allow us to simultaneously control for important 
conditional variables which might also affect innovation rates. Certainly when one controls for economic 
development, democracy, education, etc., then the causal strengths of political decentralization should 
become apparent? In Taylor (2007a), I conduct quantitative analyses along these lines, the results of 
which I briefly summarize here. Surprisingly, with but a single exception, no regression yielded a 
significant coefficient for any measure of decentralization used in any combination with any of the 
innovation measures or conditional variables. The results were triangulated using 3 distinct and 
independent measures of national innovation rates, 4 different measures of political decentralization (both 
vertical and horizontal), and over a dozen different control variables (Figure 5). These control variables 
were not run altogether in a “kitchen-sink” regression, but were modeled according to theory and critique 
in a back-and-forth manner between author, critics (such as talks & conference venues like this), and 
reviewers. The lone case in which the null hypothesis could be rejected occurred when countries were 
sub-divided by wealth; but here the effect was fairly small, only applied to the wealthiest subset of 
nations, and was not consistent across different measures of decentralization. This is not what one would 
expect from such a well theorized and widely accepted causal relationship. 
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Figure 5: Summary of Decentralization-Innovation Regressions
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 Of course, statistical analysis has its weaknesses and limitations; therefore, given the strength of 
decentralization theory, a subsequent set of comparative case studies was performed (Taylor 2006) to 
corroborate the quantitative analysis above. This qualitative approach adds value because it allows us to 
better (dis)confirm causal mechanisms, expose potential issues with endogeneity, and can reveal model 
specification errors (omitted variable bias is of particular concern in this case). To that end, the case 
studies examined innovation in two drastically different technologies and time periods (blood products 
1981-1987 and electric power 1879-1914) across five countries (France, Germany, Japan, UK, US) for 
each. The case studies generally corroborated the statistical findings. In neither technology did 
government structure appear to have a significant or systematic effect on innovation rates.  
However, the case studies did find that technologies in both sectors and time periods consistently 
diffused more slowly in the centralized states than in the decentralized states.37 This might explain the 
perception that innovation also occurs more rapidly in these countries. That is, since both innovation and 
                                                 
37 This is not a new or original finding, but merely confirms a prediction made in prior research. See Rogers 1995; Walker. 1969.  
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diffusion manifest themselves in the appearance of new technology, the two phenomena can be easily 
mistaken for one another at a superficial level. And given that the much of the existing evidence for a 
decentralization-innovation thesis involves stylized facts and anecdotal case studies, it is possible that the 
empirical observations reported in prior research are actually instances of political decentralization aiding 
diffusion which were misidentified as innovation. 
 Regardless, we are still left without a convincing domestic institutions explanation for differences 
in national innovation rates. Moreover, as with VOC, the failure of the aggregate empirical evidence to 
support such a well-theorized explanation is surprising. This should force us to question even our most 
axiomatic institutional causal variables. In the next section, I shall do just that; I will show that even the 
institutions of democracy and free markets are not as powerful causal agents as previously assumed. 
V. North-Acemoglu Institutions: Theoretically Broad & Compelling, Still Empirically Problematic 
The current state of the innovation debate, or at least one major strand of it, has seen revival of 
interest in basic Northian institutions. Domestic institutions were originally brought into the economic 
growth debate by Douglass North & Robert Thomas (1973), who used historical analysis to suggest that 
technological change is endogenous to them.38 At first, this might appear to confound innovation with 
investment and economic growth. But in order to explain differences in national innovation rates, research 
must draw somewhat on the economic growth literature because a) research has consistently shown that 
technological change is the main driver of modern, long-run economic growth; and therefore, b) 
economic growth scholars are producing the most often discussed theories, tests, and evidence on this 
subject.  
North & Thomas implied that “good” institutions are necessary for technology-based 
industrialization, modernization, and economic competitiveness. The institutions they focused on were 
property rights and efficient markets for trading them, and for motivating the investment and risk-taking 
necessary for innovation.39 Of course, the specification and enforcement of property rights and markets 
are political issues, therefore North later noted that political institutions need also be efficient and 
                                                 
38 North & Thomas. 1973.  
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therefore democratic.40 These arguments have recently been further developed by Acemoglu, Robinson, 
and Johnson. In a series of papers, they describe property rights, free markets, and competitive democracy 
as solutions to the commitment problems which prevent Coasian bargaining (and thereby discourage elite 
support for technological change).41 They repeatedly assert or imply that these Northian institutions are 
the essential institutional requirements for technology-driven long-run economic growth. 
But is this what we see in the innovation data? Figures 6a-6c (below) graph the national 
innovation rates for twenty-one currently industrialized democracies over the 1975-1995 period. The 
measure of innovation used is citations-weighted patents per capita (see Appendix), but similar graphs 
can be made for science-engineering publications, or other measures of technological capability. Since the 
United States is by far the most innovative country in the world during this time period, the data has been 
normalized to show each country’s innovation rate relative to that of the United States. The top graph 
presents data on those countries that are consistently the world’s most innovative nations, the middle 
graph shows the mid-level innovators, and the bottom graph highlights those countries which have had 
the most significant increases in innovation rates during the twenty year period.42 Note that each of the 
graphs uses the same vertical scale, and hence can be compared against one another. With this aggregate 
data in hand, we can begin to make some initial judgments about the plausibility of various common 
assumptions about national innovation patterns. 
What does Figure 6 tell us about Northian institutions? First, notice that there are no African, 
Latin American, or ex-communist bloc nations tracked in the graphs since most countries in these regions 
barely register on the vertical scale. Countries in these regions are indeed typified by low levels of  
                                                                                                                                                             
39 North & Thomas 1973.   
40 North 1981, 1990.    
41 Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson. 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson. 2000; Acemoglu 2003. 
42 The term “mid-level” is used here to remind us that there are approximately one hundred countries that produced little or no 
patented innovation during this period (defined as 10 or fewer patents). The only other countries not included in Figure 1 that 
innovated at a comparable level to those graphed are the USSR/Russia, South Africa, Hungary, and Hong Kong, each of which 
would be in the mid-level group. These were omitted since they are generally not considered to be amongst the industrialized 
democratic nations. 
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Figure 6a-c: Total Citations-Weighted Patents per Capita (US = 1.00) [Best viewed in color] 
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democracy, poorly functioning markets, loosely enforced property rights, and high levels of corruption. 
Hence Northian institutions seem like a good candidate for a causal explanation for their absence.  
Second, note the appearance of Taiwan and South Korea as two rapidly and increasingly 
innovative countries in Fig 6c. But recall that Taiwan was until recently an authoritarian state, remaining 
under martial law for four decades until 1987, and one-party rule until 1991 when President Chiang 
Ching-kuo gradually liberalized and democratized the system. Meanwhile South Korea was ruled by 
various autocrats and military dictators until its first democratic elections in 1987. Hence both Taiwan and 
South Korea democratized after their surge in innovation rates had begun, not before. What about market 
institutions? Israel is instructive here. Israel has always had a high level of democracy, but from 1970-
1980 its economic market institutions suffered from an increase in non-market government coordination, 
subsidies, and transfers. Yet Israel’s innovation rate increased despite this move towards what Hall & 
Soskice might call a coordinated market economy.43 Similar stories could be told regarding Japan during 
the last century, in which both democratic and market institutions gyrated drastically against a backdrop 
of steadily increasing innovation. Hence neither a strong democracy nor strong markets seem to have 
been a prerequisite for high levels of innovation in these countries. Finally, note that there are fairly large 
difference in innovation rates amongst the top & mid-level innovators, yet most of them share similar 
institutions, with relatively strong and well enforced property rights, democracies, and markets. Indeed 
there are several countries (e.g. New Zealand, Portugal, Greece, Brazil, Costa Rica, etc.) which have 
decades of good or improving domestic institutions but little corresponding improvement in national 
innovation rates. Indeed, if domestic institutions are so powerful, then how can we explain Spain? Spain 
has been institutionally transformed from a socialist military dictatorship into a market-oriented, 
competitive, decentralized democracy but as yet without any apparent change in innovation rates! 
It is important to restate here that I am not arguing that democracy and free markets have no 
causal effects on innovation rates. Rather, I contend that existing theories which put these institutions at 
their core as necessary or sufficient for sustained technological innovation have been over-stated, over-
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simplified, and need to be re-examined. They simply do not have the predictive or explanatory power we 
assume them to have. 
 So where do we stand? The NIS scholars have found that: pick your favorite policy or mid-level 
institution (financial system, anti-trust regime, education policy, etc.), and you can find both highly 
innovative and lowly innovative states which employ it. The innovation devil may yet be in the policy 
details, but twenty years of research have yet to identify him. VOC scholars attempted to explain this by 
arguing that both NIS institutions and innovative behavior are endogenous to markets, but the empirical 
data fails to show any aggregate effect of a nation’s “variety of capitalism” on innovation rates. Political 
decentralization theory can then be brought in to argue that both NIS institutions and a nation’s variety of 
capitalism are endogenous to government structure. But decades of technology patents, science-
engineering publications, and high tech export data fail to substantiate any of these hypotheses. Finally, 
even the broadest of domestic institutions (democracy and economic freedom) do not seem to be 
necessary or sufficient to explain national innovation rates. What’s going on? 
I argue in the next section that what’s going on is omitted variable bias. Specifically, I will 
suggest that certain kinds of international relationships (e.g. capital goods imports, foreign direct 
investment, educational exchanges) might have a significant role in determining national innovation rates. 
These relationships are generally overlooked in the debates over domestic institutions, and often go 
unaccounted for. I will show that when controlled for, a country’s international relationships with the lead 
innovator do a better job of explaining innovation rates than institutions alone. 
 
VI. International Relationships: A Case of Omitted Variable Bias 
Why should international relationships matter? Theoretically, the causal mechanisms are diverse: 
international relationships may affect innovation rates by acting as conduits for valuable scientific and 
technical knowledge, by allowing the formation of epistemic communities, or perhaps via mechanisms 
not yet identified (see Taylor 2007b for full discussion). But most immediately, an interest in international 
relationships as an alternate explanation for differences in national innovation rates also emerges out of 
                                                                                                                                                             
43 Hall and Soskice. 2001.  
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the research on domestic institutions. For example, we saw above that statistical analysis of the VOC 
theory of technological innovation consistently points to the United States as an important outlier in 
global patterns of innovation. We can also observe that many of the world’s most innovative countries are 
those which also tend to have the strongest military and economic ties with the US, such as Japan, 
Canada, the UK, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. Other research on comparative innovation rates in East 
Asia has also emphasized the importance of linkages between international relationships and innovation, 
though specifically in the cases of Japan vis-a-vis the US during the Cold War, and Southeast Asia vis-a-
vis Japan during the mid-1980s through mid-1990s.44 Might these anecdotal observations be indicative of 
a more general causal relationship? 
There are also strong indications of an important role for international relationships within the 
empirical evidence put forward by domestic institutionalists themselves.45 For example, although Alice 
Amsden emphasizes institutional explanations in her studies of industrialization in East Asia, her 
evidence consistently reports the vital role of foreign technical assistance in helping South Korea, Taiwan, 
China, etc. approach the technological frontier. Similarly, in a 2000 collection of case studies on 
innovation in the developing world assembled by lead NIS researcher, Richard Nelson, scholars 
repeatedly mention the importance of international relationships: joint ventures, contacts with foreign 
suppliers and consumers, and other forms of cross-national contacts.46  Meanwhile, atheoretical histories 
of technological development and industrialization in 18th, 19th, and 20th century Europe and the United 
States are replete with instances of national innovation rates being affected by international 
relationships.47 And this phenomenon is not necessarily limited to technological catch-up by lesser 
developed states, since even advanced industrialized nations seem to benefit technologically from ties to 
lead innovators.48
                                                 
44 Taylor, 1995 
45 Amsden 1989, 2001; Yamashita 1991 
46 Kim and Nelson 2000.  
47 Jeremy 1991;Cowan 1997.    
48 Keller 2004; Cantwell 1995. 
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It is also interesting that many of the countries which suffer from low innovation rates also appear 
to have poor international relationships with the world’s lead innovators. For example, the poorly 
innovating African, Latin American, and ex-communist bloc nations discussed in the previous section 
(and missing from Figure 6) are typified by both bad institutions and fewer and shallower international 
relationships with the lead innovators. Meanwhile, each of highly innovative South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, 
and Japan had relatively bad institutions by Northian standards, but was typified by strong international 
relationships with the lead innovators, especially the United States, involving major transfers of scientific 
& technical knowledge via imports, foreign direct investment, and educational exchanges.   
Together, these stylized observations suggest the possibility of omitted variable bias in the 
innovation debate. They suggest that in order to better understand the political economy of national 
innovation rates, research should perhaps focus less exclusively on comparisons of domestic institutions, 
and examine more deeply the effects of international relationships. This is not to argue that domestic 
institutions are insignificant, but that factors such as those listed below in Figure 7 between the lead 
innovator and other countries should be examined for their effects on innovation.  
 
Figure 7: International Relationships Important for National Innovation Rates 
■ overseas training  & education in science-engineering 
■ use of foreign consultants & technical assistance 
■ overseas plant visits 
■ consultations with foreign capital goods & high technology suppliers/consumers 
■ inward FDI in production and R&D facilities from more advanced countries 
■ mergers & acquisitions 
■ joint R&D projects 
■ immigration of scientists, engineers, and highly skilled labor 
■ establishing R&D facilities in high-tech countries 
■ attendance to international expositions, conferences, & lectures  
■ technology licensing 
■ imports of capital goods & high technology products 
 
 If the international relationships listed in Figure 7 are important for explaining differences in 
national innovation rates, then such linkages should be evident in the empirical data. That is, countries 
with more of these kinds of international relationships and higher levels of them, should be observed to 
innovate relatively more than countries that are less well connected, even when we control for the quality 
of domestic institutions.  
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How can we probe for this? Unfortunately, there is no single variable which captures the myriad 
international relationships listed in Figure 7. Also, different countries have different combinations of 
these international relationships depending on their availability, costs, benefits, and historical experience. 
While this diversity handicaps empirical research, we can as a “first cut” look at some of the most likely, 
and best measured, indices of international relationships to see if there is any macro-level evidence at all 
for a linkage between international relationships and national innovation rates. These measures include 
(each vis-a-vis the United States): graduate students sent to study science or engineering in US 
universities, imports of capital goods from, inward FDI received from, and outward FDI into the US. 
Clearly, these measures only capture an imperfect subset of the many international relationships listed in 
Figure 7, and are restricted to relationships with the US,49 therefore the results should be interpreted as an 
initial step in a larger research program. But they do serve the purpose of an exploratory probe. 
 The best way to simultaneously control for multiple independent variables in a generalizeable 
manner is through regression analysis. Therefore, let me briefly report the regression results, which the 
interested reader can inspect more thoroughly for rigor and specification in Taylor (2007b). In these 
regressions, I took a slightly different approach than used previously. Rather than merely testing whether 
or not institution or relationship X was significant, I controlled for them simultaneously. This allows us to 
ask whether international relationships matter even if you control for domestic institutions, and vice versa. 
Despite its simplicity, this type of testing appears not to have yet been done. Using factor analysis, I 
combined data on international relationships into a single IR-factor, which I then used as a regressor 
alongside the usual measures of Northian institutions.  
                                                 
49 Each of these measures focuses specifically on countries’ relationships with the lead innovator, the United States. Although 
this is done primarily for purposes of data availability and cost, it also has several desirable properties. First, the international 
relationships described in the last section should ideally be geared towards relatively more innovative countries, preferably the 
lead innovator. In other words, Mexico (or any other country) should gain far more by establishing multiple strong ties with the 
world’s lead innovator as opposed to creating these same ties with say Spain. Second, limiting the observables to relationships 
with the US actually strengthens the probe of these relationships. For example, Mexico sends its students to study science and 
engineering in US, Spain, Britain and several other advanced countries. Ideally we would want data on all of these student flows. 
And by restricting measurement of student flows to those destined only for the US, a potential bias is created against finding 
evidence supporting an international relationships linkage, and thus a stronger probe. On the other hand, focusing only on 
relationships with the US also introduces the possibility of selection bias: there may be some variable specific to US relations 
which affects national innovation rates. Note that this would not nullify a positive finding of the significance of international 
relationships, but rather particularize it to the US. 
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The first and most important finding of the regressions was that international relationships appear 
to strongly affect national innovation rates. Almost every regression yielded a significant and positive 
coefficient for the IR-factor, regardless of regression technique employed, lag structure used, or control 
variable included (or omitted). How do we know that international relationships affect innovation rates, 
rather than the reverse? I attempted to answer this question in several ways: by running time-series cross-
section regressions, by using increasing time lags between the independent and dependent variables, and 
by using a lagged DV. In all cases, I found that the coefficients for the IR Factor are consistently positive 
and significant. The second, and perhaps more interesting, result is that the coefficients for domestic 
institutions were generally small and often insignificant. This occurred for several measures of democracy 
(Polity II, Freedom House, POLCON); while the coefficients for the Fraiser Index of economic freedom 
were somewhat larger, though often insignificant. Interestingly, neither the strength of international 
relationships nor the relative weakness of the domestic institutions measures was much affected by each 
other’s presence or absence in the regression models. That is, the regression results were fairly robust to 
changes in the model and reveal that we do not need to hold domestic institutions constant in order for 
international relationships to reveal their effects. 
 But we do not need regressions to illustrate these findings; many of them can be clearly seen in 
the following two simple charts. Figure 8a traces technological innovation, Northian institutions, and a 
single type of international relationship in Taiwan (a rapidly innovative country). Figure 8b does so in 
Portugal (a slowly innovative country). These two countries are not outliers, similar comparisons could be 
made for a number of country pairs (indeed including Spain’s would have been a far more dramatic 
comparison). The numbers on the vertical scale indicate the levels of democracy (Polity II score), 
economic market freedom (Fraiser Index), and the quantity of science-engineering graduates students sent 
to study in US universities. The national innovate rate has simply been scaled for time-series comparison 
and has no relationship with the numbers on Y-axis. 
Figure 8a illustrates what we already know: that Taiwan’s innovative “take-off” occurred long 
before its institutional reforms. While some might posit that Taiwan’s seeds of democracy were planted 
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prior to this, it is simply hard to argue that Taiwan was functionally democratic or free market prior to 
1991, or at least not according to the standards laid down by the theories of North or Acemoglu. But what 
did change for Taiwan was that its relationships with lead innovators increased in scope and depth. One 
measure of this is the number of students, first hundreds and later thousands, students sent to US 
universities to earn science & engineering PhD’s. Their training abroad precedes and matches Taiwan’s 
innovation spurt. Similarly major increases can be found in many of Taiwan’s other international 
relationships listed in Figure 7. A more thorough discussion of how Taiwan linked with the United States 
to forge its innovative capabilities can be found in Breznitz (2007).  
Figure 8a [Best viewed in color] 
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Now examine Portugal’s transition to democracy during the mid-1970s and its attendant increase 
in economic market freedoms (Figure 8b). These were major and pervasive institutional changes, 
sweeping the entire political-economy of Portugal. And yet despite these dramatic transformations, we 
observe no attendant change in Portugal’s national innovation rate. It remained essentially flat during the 
1970-1995 period. Portugal did increase its level of PhDs sent to study science or engineering in the US, 
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but only from ~5 to ~25 individuals. Similarly minor increases can be shown for Portugal’s other 
international relationships listed in Figure 7.  
Figure 8b [Best viewed in color] 
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VII. Alternate Explanations 
There several possible alternate explanations for the findings above. First and foremost, it may be 
that Northian institutions determine international relationships, and that this linkage is not being properly 
controlled for. The argument here would be that market institutions limit government discretion, while 
participatory democracy increases the input of diverse interest groups. These domestic institutions 
combine to increase investor confidence, both foreign and domestic, and thereby lead to greater 
innovation.50 Certainly there is considerable research which shows that extremely poor domestic 
institutions (child labor, forced labor, lack of property rights, incompetent bureaucrats, etc.) correspond 
with lowers levels of FDI, capital goods imports, educational exchanges, etc.51 Also, high-levels of 
                                                 
50 Henisz 2000; Rodrik 2000; Jensen 2003. 
51 Braun 2006; Harms & Ursprung 2002. 
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regular expropriation do have a negative affect on inward FDI, general investment, and hence the basis 
for innovation.  
However, there is also much research which suggests that domestic institutions need to be quite 
dysfunctional or perverse before they begin to interfere significantly with foreign trade and investment.52 
Moreover, neither high levels of democracy nor free markets are requisites for avoiding institutional 
dysfunction. This is not to suggest that investors are indifferent towards strong property rights, political & 
economic stability, and minimal taxes, but rather that democracy and free markets do not always improve 
these conditions. Indeed, according to recent scholarship, “good” institutions have actually worsened the 
incentives for investment in some countries.53 In the last decade, empirical research using large cross-
national time-series, regional datasets, and even single country case-studies have consistently found that 
general political and economic freedoms do not determine the international relationships important to 
innovation discussed here. Again, one need only consider the cases of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, 
etc. (each of which achieved high innovation rates accompanied by either relatively repressive regimes, 
heavy government intervention in the economy, or both) to conclude that we need better research and 
more nuanced theorizing in this area. 
On the quantitative side, I tried to address these concerns in several ways. I experimented with 
two-way and three-way interaction terms, which were consistently insignificant, suggesting that the 
effects of international relationships are not conditional on either economic freedom or democracy. Nor 
did regressions of the IR-factor on domestic institutions reveal a strong linear relationship between the 
two: the coefficients were significant but small, sensitive to time-period and level of development, and the 
R2’s were low. Admittedly these are simple prima facie tests. I do not pretend that they fully resolve the 
issue, or that domestic institutions and international relationships have no connection. But they do suggest 
that the findings above cannot be cavalierly dismissed as un-modeled conditionality. They contribute to 
                                                 
52 Gallagher 2002; Busse 2004; Archer, Biglaiser & DeRouen 2007. 
53 Li & Resnick 2003; Egger and Winner 2004; Biglaiser and Derouen 2006. 
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the evidence that national innovation rates present an anomaly which deserves greater attention, and 
cannot be explained away as a simple statistical error. 
 As another possible explanation, it is tempting to suspect that the use of US-based patent 
measures creates an automatic bias in favor of significance for the US-based international-relationships 
factor, however this appears not to be the case. A check of an independent dataset of European Patent 
Office international patent data reveals them to correlate highly with USPTO international patent data; 
which means that whatever phenomena the US patent data are capturing, the EU patent data capture 
comparably well. This makes sense since citations-weighted patents are a valid measure of national 
innovation rates, and correlate well with other macro indicators which we tend to associate with 
innovation. (Readers are encouraged to read the Appendix on innovation measurement and the 
strengths/weaknesses of patent measures). Therefore either there is not a significant US bias in the 
international patent data, or it somehow exists in all of the measures with which this data correlates. In 
order to be sure, a set of regressions was run in which the dependent variable was broadened, via factor 
analysis, to include citations-weighted international scientific publications and high tech exports. These 
regressions yielded results similar to those using only patents. Another set of regressions was then run in 
which the international-relationships factor was broadened to include overall FDI flows and capital goods 
imports, not just those with the US; again yielding similar results. Thus although the acquisition or 
citation of an international patent may be a type of international relationship, it is of a distinctly different 
kind than those measured by the regressors. Discussions of other alternatives can be found in Taylor 
(2007b) 
VIII Conclusions and Implications
The point of this paper is not to argue that domestic institutions have no effect on national 
innovation rates, but rather to defuse some widely accepted, but unsubstantiated, generalizations about the 
sources of technological innovation. The domestic institutions discussed above are frequently paraded out 
as “accepted wisdom” during discussions of national innovation rates. And certainly some of them might 
make sense when used to explain a particular country’s innovation rate at a specific point in time. Yet on 
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closer consideration, we find that not one of them can be consistently applied across time and space to 
explain the world’s most innovative countries. Thus I am not contending that institutions do not matter at 
all; but the data does suggest that existing institutional theories have been over-stated and over-simplified 
in the literature. There is sufficient empirical evidence (or lack thereof) for social scientists to say that 
institutions are not causal in-and-of themselves, or at least they are not necessary and sufficient causes of 
differences in innovation.  
Thus, the research reviewed here suggests a change in the debate over national innovation rates. It 
suggests that a single-minded focus on finding an institutional explanation can blind scholars to important 
political variables that play powerful roles in affecting technological change. Along these lines, this paper 
has suggested that international relationships may be the solution to the innovation rate puzzle. 
International relationships are often overlooked in the search for the “right” institutions to explain 
nations’ technological performance. But the empirical evidence suggests that certain kinds of 
international relations are as important as, and perhaps more important than, domestic institutions in 
determining national innovation rates. This conclusion is admittedly tentative, and considerable work 
remains to be done in establishing the importance of international relationships relative to domestic 
institutions, and identifying the exact mechanisms by which they foster innovation. But we cannot 
properly develop this avenue of research if we refuse to travel down it or to allow into the debate those 
who have. 
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Appendix: Measuring Nationnal Innovation Rates 
 The most frequently used measure of innovation is patents. The debate over the proper use of 
patent data has proceeded vigorously and with increasing sophistication over the past several decades. 
The current consensus holds that patent data are acceptable measures of innovation when used in the 
aggregate (e.g. as a rough measure of national levels of innovation across long periods of time), but are 
not appropriate when used as a measure of micro-level innovation (to compare the innovativeness of 
individual firms or specific industries from year to year). And while this debate is ongoing and is better 
recounted elsewhere, this section will address some of the more pressing issues surrounding patent 
measures and their use in testing.54  
Strictly speaking, a patent is a temporary legal monopoly granted by the government to an 
inventor for the commercial use of her invention, where the invention can take the form of a process, 
machine, article of manufacture, or compositions of matters, or any new useful improvement thereof. 
(USPTO)55 A patent is a specific property right which is granted only after formal examination of the 
invention has revealed it to be nontrivial (i.e. it would not appear obvious to a skilled user of the relevant 
technology), useful (i.e. it has potential commercial value), and novel (i.e. it is significantly different than 
existing technology). As such, patents have characteristics which make them a potentially useful tool for 
the quantification of inventive activity. First, patents are by definition related to innovation, each 
representing a “quantum of invention” that has passed the scrutiny of a trained specialist and gained the 
support of investors and researchers who must dedicate time, effort, and often significant resources for its 
physical development and subsequent legal protection. Second, patent data are widely available, and are 
perhaps the only observable result of inventive activity which covers almost every field of invention in 
most developed countries over long periods of time. Third, the granting of patents is based on relatively 
objective and slowly changing standards. Finally, the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the 
European Patent Office provide researchers with centralized patenting institutions for the two largest 
markets for new technology. In practical terms, this allows researchers to get around the issue of national 
differences in patenting laws as well as providing two separate and fairly independent data pools.  
Given these qualities, patents have been used as a basis for the economic analysis of innovative 
activity for over thirty-five years. Current use began with the pioneering work of Frederic Scherer and 
Jacob Schmookler who used patent statistics to investigate the demand-side determinants of innovation.56 
However, the labor intensive nature of patent analysis, which used to involve the manual location and 
coding of thousands of patent documents, severely limited the extent (or at least the appeal) of their use in 
political and economic research. These limitations were eased somewhat during the 1970s when the 
advent of machine-readable patent data sparked a wave of econometric analysis.57 In the late 1980s, the 
                                                 
54 For a review of the debate see Griliches, Zvi. 1990. “Patents Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey”. Journal of 
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(3):511-515; Eaton, J. and S. Kortum. 1999. “International Technology Diffusion: Theory and Measurement” International 
Economic Review 40 (3):537-570; Jaffe, Adam B., Adam, Manuel Trajtenberg, and Michael Fogarty. 2000. “The Meaning of 
Patent Citations: Report of the NBER/Case Western Reserve Survey of Patentees” Working Paper, 7631. Cambridge, MA: 
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Patent Citations: A First Look” Working Paper, 7741. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
55 Designs and plant life can also be patented, however most econometric analysis of patent data is confined to utility patents 
granted for inventions such as those listed above. For a fuller description of patents and patent laws, classifications, and the 
application process see http://www.uspto.gov/main/patents.htm. 
56 Scherer, Frederic M. 1965. “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented Innovations” American 
Economic Review 55 (5):1097-1125; Schmookler, Jacob. 1966. Invention and Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
57 Summaries of which can be found in Griliches, Zvi ed. 1984. R&D, Patents, and Productivity. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press; Pakes, Ariel. 1986. “Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks” 
Econometrica 54 (4):755-784; Griliches, Zvi, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Ariel Pakes. 1987. “The Value of Patents as Indicators of 
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use of patent data was further facilitated by computerization, which increased the practical size of patent 
datasets into millions of observations. Most recently, Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg at the NBER have 
compiled a statistical database of several million patents complete with geographic, industry, and citation 
information, which I use in Figures 1-8 above.58
However, patents do have significant drawbacks which somewhat restrict, but by no means 
eliminate, their usage as an index of innovation. First, there is the classification problem, in that it is 
difficult to assign a particular industry to a patent, especially since the industry of invention may not be 
the industry of eventual production or the industry of use or benefit. I address this issue, where possible, 
by using two different patent datasets with assorted systems and levels of patent classification. Second, it 
is not yet clear what fraction of the universe of innovation is represented by patents, since not all 
inventions are patentable and not all patentable inventions are patented. This problem is exacerbated 
when attempting comparative research since different industries and different countries may exhibit 
significant variance in their propensity to patent. One can address these concerns by using publications 
data in addition to patents. And although patents and publications both may be imprecise measures of 
innovation, as long as this measurement error is random and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, 
then regressions using this data should produce unbiased estimates of the coefficients (and generally with 
inflated standard errors).  
Finally, some critics point out that patents vary widely in their technical and economic 
significance: most are for minor inventions, while a few represent extremely valuable and far-reaching 
innovations. Moreover, it has been found that simple patent counts do not provide a good measure of the 
radical-ness, importance, or “size” of an innovation. Simple patents counts correlate well with innovation 
inputs such as R&D outlays, but they are too noisy to serve as anything but a very rough measure of 
innovation output.59 Therefore I use patent counts which have been weighted by forward citations. 
Forward citations on patents have been found to be a good indicator of the importance or value of an 
innovation, just as scholarly journal articles are often valuated by the number of times they are cited. The 
idea here is that minor or incremental innovations receive few if any citations, and revolutionary 
innovations receive tens or hundreds. Empirical support for this interpretation has arisen in various 
quarters: citation weighted patents have been found to correlate well with market value of the corporate 
patent holder, the likelihood of patent renewal and litigation, inventor perception of value, and other 
measures of innovation outputs.60   
A final potential weakness is that it is often unclear what fraction of a nation’s innovation is 
actually patented, or to what degree selection bias exists in any given set of patent data. This problem is 
exacerbated when we consider that different countries may exhibit significant variance in their propensity 
to patent. However, at the national level, patents have also been found to correlate highly with other 
measures which we generally associate with aggregate innovation rates, including GDP growth, 
manufacturing growth, exports of capital goods, R&D spending, capital formation, Nobel Prize winners, 
etc.61 Perhaps a simple litmus test of the appropriateness of patents is that one cannot find a 
technologically innovative country which is not relatively well represented by its aggregate patent data; 
even the Soviet Union during its period of isolation from the West regularly patented at a rate roughly 
representative of its overall relative technological prowess. Therefore, although citations-weighted patents 
                                                                                                                                                             
Inventive Activity” in Economic Policy and Technological Performance edited by Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman, 68-103. 
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61 Amsden, Alice H. and Mona Mourshed. 1997. “Scientific Publications, Patents and Technological Capabilities in Late-
Industrializing Countries" Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 9(3). 
   36
are by no means a perfect measure of innovation, and should always be corroborated by other measures 
wherever possible, they can be used with some confidence to judge the relative innovative performance of 
different countries. Certainly there are nations which do not patent, but which are highly innovative in 
fashion, design, arts, and culture, and see noticeable economic gains from these accomplishments. But 
when it comes to technological innovation per se, patents appear to be a useful quantitative measure.  
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